Poverty is associated with a wide range of counterproductive economic behaviors. Scarcity theory proposes that poverty itself induces a scarcity mindset, which subsequently forces the poor into suboptimal decisions and behaviors. The purpose of our work is to provide an integrated, up-to-date, critical review of this theory. To this end, we reviewed the empirical evidence for three fundamental propositions: Poverty leads to attentional focus and neglect causing overborrowing, poverty induces trade-off thinking resulting in more consistent consumption decisions, and poverty reduces (...) mental bandwidth and subsequently increases time discounting and risk aversion. Our findings indicate that the current literature predominantly confirms the first and second proposition, although methodological issues prevent a firm conclusion. Evidence for the third proposition was not conclusive. Additionally, we evaluated the overall status of scarcity theory. Although the theory provides an original, coherent, and parsimonious explanation for the relationship between financial scarcity and economic decision making, the theory does not fully accord with the data and lacks some precision. We conclude that both theoretical and empirical work are needed to build a stronger theory. (shrink)

Introduction. Eating Disorders (EDs) are serious psychiatric disorders, impacting physical and psychosocial functioning, often with a chronic course and high mortality rates. The two continua model of mental health states that mental health is a complete state, that is not merely the absence of mental illness, but also the presence of mental health. This model was studied among ED patients by comparing the levels of well-being to the Dutch general population and by examining the of well-being and psychopathology. Method. A (...) total of 468 female ED patients participated in this study during application and intake at a specialized ED treatment centre in the Netherlands. They filled out questionnaires about well-being (MHC-SF), general psychopathology (OQ-45), and ED psychopathology (EDE-Q). Categorical and mean well-being levels were calculated. Also, the correlates of these variables were examined with Pearson correlation and multiple hierarchical regression analysis. Results. ED patients showed lower levels of emotional, psychological and social well-being on average compared to the general population. About 26% of the ED patients experienced low levels of well-being (languishing). However, also 13% experienced high levels of well-being (flourishing), varying between 9% in Anorexia Nervosa to 25% in Binge Eating Disorder. ED psychopathology and general well-being showed a moderate negative correlation. For patients with Bulimia Nervosa and Binge Eating Disorder however no such correlation was found. Lower general psychopathology, not having a history of hospitalization for the ED, and adaptive personal functioning were correlated with well-being among ED patients. Conclusion This study shows initial support for the two continua model of mental health among ED patients. Psychopathology and well-being should be considered as related, but distinct dimensions of mental health in ED patients. Further research should focus on the possible reciprocal relationships between psychopathology and well-being during recovery. It is recommended to monitor well-being during treatment and to implement interventions for well-being to realize complete recovery for those patients with inadequate levels of well-being. (shrink)

In den letzten Jahren hat das theoretische und praktische Interesse an Diagrammen stark zugenommen. Kultur- und Bildwissenschaft, Philosophie, Medientheorie, Gestaltung und Kognitionsforschung sind gleichermaßen am epistemischen Gebrauch diagrammatischer Bild- und Denkformen interessiert. Bislang gibt es jedoch keine gemeinsame Lektürebasis, die die Diskussionen zu diesem Thema bündelt. In Form einer Anthologie bietet dieser Reader klassische und innovative Schlüsseltexte zur Diagrammatik aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven an. Diese enthält Texte zu theoretischen, praktischen und historischen Dimensionen des Denkens und Darstellens mit und von Diagrammen seit (...) der griechischen Antike. Ein kommentierter Bildteil veranschaulicht die reiche Geschichte der Diagrammatik anhand konkreter Beispiele. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungNach Oswald Bayer ist Schöpfung Gottes Anrede an den Menschen. Glaube an den Schöpfer ist Antwort auf das, was Gott uns in dieser Welt zusagt. Schöpfung bezieht sich auf die Gegenwart, nicht auf die Vergangenheit, auf Gottes persönliche Kommunikation mit uns und nicht nur auf unpersönliche Verursachung, auf Gottes aktive und persönliche Gegenwart in allem, das in dieser Welt geschieht, nicht auf jenseitige Transzendenz. Bayer ist darin zuzustimmen, dass die Schöpfung Gottes Gabe und Zusage ist und dass der Glaube an (...) den Schöpfer eine Antwort auf diese Anrede und eine Form der Welterfahrung ist. Die Art, wie Bayer diese Einsichten entwickelt, wirft jedoch einige schwerwiegende Probleme auf. In diesem Aufsatz werden vier Kritikpunkte vorgestellt. Erstens bringt die Bibel den Schöpfungsglauben nicht nur in Hymnen in der zweiten Person zum Ausdruck, sondern auch in Erzählungen in der dritten Person. Nehmen wir diese narrative Struktur ernst, müssen wir zweitens die Schöpfung als Gottes erste Tat in der Geschichte seines Volkes verstehen. In einer theoretischen Reflexion auf den Begriff der Schöpfung als Gottes ersten Akt, brauchen drittens wir einen theologisch modifizierten der 〉Kausalität〈 als Handeln. Schließlich und viertens ist Gott nicht nur frei in seiner Transzendenz und liebend in seiner Immanenz, wie Bayer behauptet, sondern auch liebend in seiner Transzendenz und frei in seiner Immanenz. Das bedeutet, dass wir im Gegensatz zu Bayers Darstellung auch Unterschiede der Art und Weise anerkennen müssen, wie der wollende und handelnde Gott in der Geschichte seiner Schöpfung wirksam ist.SummaryAccording to Oswald Bayer, creation is God's address to human beings. Belief in the Creator is a response to what God promises us in this world. Creation is about our present, not about the past; about God's personal communication with us, not about impersonal causation; about God's active and personal presence in everything that happens in this world, not about otherworldly transcendence. With Bayer it is right to say that creation is God's gift and promise, and that belief in the Creator is a response to this address and a way of experiencing this world. The manner in which Bayer spells out these insights, however, raises some serious problems. In this article four criticisms are made. First, the Bible expresses belief in God's creation not only in hymns in the second person, but also in narratives in the third person. Second, when we take these narratives seriously, we have to think about creation as the first act of God in the history of His people. Third, in a theoretical reflection about the concept of creation as God's first act, we need a theologically modified concept of ‘causation’ as agency. And last, God is not only free in His transcendence, and loving in His immanence, as Bayer claims, but also loving in His transcendence and free in His immanence. This implies, in contrast to Bayer's account, that we have to acknowledge differences in the way the willing and acting God is involved in the history of His creation. (shrink)

Epistemological disjunctivists make two strong claims about perceptual experience's epistemic value: experience guarantees the knowledgeable character of perceptual beliefs; experience's epistemic value is “reflectively accessible”. In this paper I develop a form of disjunctivism grounded in a presentational view of experience, on which the epistemic benefits of experience consist in the way perception presents the subject with aspects of her environment. I show that presentational disjunctivism has both dialectical and philosophically fundamental advantages over more traditional expositions. Dialectically, presentational disjunctivism resolves (...) a puzzle disjunctivists face in their posture vis-à-vis skeptical scenarios. More systematically, presentational disjunctivism provides an especially compelling view of disjunctivism as an internalist view of perceptual consciousness by explaining the way perceptual presence manifests the subject's rationality in a distinct way. (shrink)

Negative disjunctivists like Mike Martin and Bill Fish understand hallucinations in purely epistemic terms, and do not attribute phenomenal character to these visual misfires. However, the approaches by Martin and Fish are importantly different, and there has been little systematic work on how negative disjunctivism is motivated. In this paper, I argue for a version of negative disjunctivism that centers on the idea that perception involves the exercise of a fallible self-conscious capacity. I claim that this at once explains hallucinations (...) in purely negative terms that are close to Martin’s approach, while at the same time providing negative disjunctivism with an explanatory basis that Fish attempts to provide and Martin’s view lacks. (shrink)

According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), ordinary perceptual experience ensures an opportunity for perceptual knowledge. In recent years, two distinct models of this idea have been developed. For Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological disjunctivism, 2012, Oxford University Press; Epistemic angst: Radical skepticism and the groundlessness of our believing, 2012, Princeton University Press), perception provides distinctly powerful reasons for belief. By contrast, Clayton Littlejohn (Journal of Philosophical Research, 41, 201; Knowledge first, 2017, Oxford University Press; Normativity: Epistemic and practical, 2018, Oxford University Press) and (...) Alan Millar (The nature and value of knowledge: Three investigations, 2010, Oxford University Press; Philosophical Issues, 21, 332) argue for a version of ED in terms of a “knowledge first” program, on which perception directly provides knowledge, without relying on antecedent reasons or justification. Specifically, both Littlejohn and Millar argue that “reasons first” ED faces a problematic regress. In this article, I defend “reasons first” ED by arguing that experience provides a type of reason that escapes the regress. I also argue that reasons are a fundamental aspect of ED, especially in its anti-skeptical stance. (shrink)

Leibniz war gewillt, die Idee der kontingenten Wahrheiten über nur mögliche individuelle Substanzen ernst zu nehmen -unabhängig davon, ob diese Substanzen existieren oder nicht. Einer der Wege, diese Idee zu erklären, ist die berühmte Lehre von der unendlichen Analyse. Eine wichtige und verwirrende Schwierigkeit für diese Lehre ist das von Robert M. Adams erörterte Problem des Beweises mit Glück. Auch wenn der vollständige individuelle Begriff einer möglichen Substanz S sich durch Analyse in unendlich viele einfache Begriffe zerlegen läßt, ist (...) es schwerlich erforderlich, daß der Beweis für das Enthaltensein eines Prädikats F im vollständigen Begriff von 5 unendlicher Analyse bedarf: Beweise gehen schrittweise vor; es ist offensichtlich möglich, daß einige Prädikate früher und schneller hergeleitet werden als andere. In diesem Aufsatz zeigen und entwickeln wir zwei leibnizische Wege, die das Problem des mit Glück kurzen Beweises beantworten. (shrink)

Epistemological disjunctivists hold that perceiving subjects have “reflective access” to factive perceptual support for belief. However, little has been done to elaborate the intended notion of reflection, or introspective awareness more generally. Moreover, critics have pointed out that the disjunctivist conception of “reflective access” can seem vulnerable to varieties of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. In this paper I defend disjunctivism from this charge, arguing that it holds the resources for a potent defense of the claim that knowledge of perceptual states is (...) luminous. Indeed, I argue that appreciating the relation between disjunctivism and luminosity sheds critical light on how the disjunctivist conceives of perceptual support for belief. (shrink)

In recent work, Scott Soames (2010, 2013, 2015, 2019) and Peter Hanks (2011, 2013, 2015) have developed a theory of propositions on which these are constituted by complexes of intellectual acts. In this article, I adapt this type of theory to provide an account of perceptual content. After introducing terminology in section 1, I detail the approach proffered by Soames and Hanks in section 2, focusing on Hanks’s version. In section 3, I introduce a problem that these theories face, namely, (...) how to account for the unity among the relevant intellectual acts. Section 4 provides an answer to this problem of unity, while section 5 explicates the relation to Soames and Hanks. In section 6, I extend the model to a theory of the unity of experiential consciousness. Finally, in section 7, I apply the preceding considerations to debates about the nature of perceptual representation. The upshot will be that experiential unity is not simply a phenomenal feature of consciousness, but central to an account of the role perceptual representation plays in perceptual cognition. (shrink)

A new system of dynamic logic is introduced and motivated, witha novel approach to variable binding for incremental interpretation. Thesystem is shown to be equivalent to first order logic and complete.The new logic combines the dynamic binding idea from DynamicPredicate Logic with De Bruijn style variable free indexing. Quantifiersbind the next available variable register; the indexing mechanismguarantees that active registers are never overwritten by newquantifiers actions. Apart from its interest in its own right, theresulting system has certain advantages over (...) Dynamic Predicate Logic orDiscourse Representation Theory. It comes with a more well behaved(i.e., transitive) consequence relation, it gives a more explicitaccount of how anaphoric context grows as text gets processed, and ityields new insight into the dynamics of anaphoric linking in reasoning.Incremental dynamics also points to a new way of handling contextdynamically in Montague grammar. (shrink)

What is the role of conscious experience in the epistemology of perceptual knowledge: how should we characterise what is going on in seeing that o is F in order to illuminate the contribution of seeing o to their status as cases of knowing that o is F? My proposal is that seeing o involves conscious acquaintance with o itself, the concrete worldly source of the truth that o is F, in a way that may make it evident to the subject (...) that o is an instance of ‘x is F’ as she understands this, and hence evident that o is F. Seeing that o is F is thus a way of its being evident that o is F and is therefore a way of knowing that o is F. (shrink)

Humans are experts in cooperating with each other when trying to accomplish tasks they cannot achieve alone. Recent studies of joint action have shown that when performing tasks together people strongly rely on the neurocognitive mechanisms that they also use when performing actions individually, that is, they predict the consequences of their co‐actor’s behavior through internal action simulation. Context‐sensitive action monitoring and action selection processes, however, are relatively underrated but crucial ingredients of joint action. In the present paper, we try (...) to correct the somewhat simplified view on joint action by reviewing recent studies of joint action simulation, monitoring, and selection while emphasizing the intricate interrelationships between these processes. We complement our review by defining the contours of a neurologically plausible computational framework of joint action. (shrink)

The paper presents a speculative model for associative memory. It has two layers: the lower layer describes memory of a single cell, the upper layer describes how the work is distributed address-free over a large set of cells. Thinking, consciousness and various features of memory are interpreted in terms of the memory model.

Evaluative conditioning refers to the changes in liking of an evaluatively neutral stimulus (the conditional stimulus or CS) as a result of merely pairing it with another, already liked or disliked stimulus (the unconditional stimulus or US). We examined whether other, non‐evaluative stimulus properties of a US can also be associatively transferred to a CS. In a series of experiments, we tried to transfer perceptions of the gender of children and the gender of first names. We found evidence for the (...) associative transfer of these properties but only when participants were aware of the contingencies. (shrink)

This volume offers a critical re-assessment of the thought of Ernst Bloch, best-known for his groundbreaking study The Principle of Hope and one of the most significant European thinkers and public intellectuals of the twentieth century. It explores Bloch's life, work and reception; his debt to Marx and Hegel; his central concepts of hope and utopia; his affinities with philosophers such as Gramsci and Zizek; and his radical reframing of our understanding of history, society and culture. Above all, this (...) volume examines the relevance of Bloch's ideas today, in a world still shot through with economic inequality and social injustice. Contributors are: Agata Bielik-Robson, Ivan Boldyrev, Henk de Berg, Sam Dolbear, Vincent Geoghegan, Holger Glinka, Loren Goldman, Douglas Kellner, Cat Moir, Jan Rehmann, Nina Rismal, Johan Siebers, and Peter Thompson. (shrink)